Cut-paper illustration of a large server rack as a marionette master, strings running down to laptops and small servers, with one red node cutting its string with scissors

On November 17, CISA added a Puppet flaw to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog. The fix has existed since November 3. A working proof of concept has been public just as long. If you run Puppet and you have not patched yet, the two weeks between the fix and the KEV listing were the grace period. It is over.

The flaw is CVE-2026-115731, a deserialization bug in Puppet Server's report processing, scored 9.4 Critical. It lets any machine holding a CA-signed Puppet agent certificate run code on the Puppet Server. And in a lot of shops, getting that certificate takes no authentication at all.

The bug is in the report your agents already send

Every Puppet agent sends a run report back to the server when it finishes. That report goes to the /puppet/v3/report endpoint on TCP 8140 as a JSON object. The server deserializes it, and the deserializer trusts a field in the report called __ptype to decide what kind of object it is building. Security researchers at Neodyme found that a crafted report can steer that process into generating a Ruby class from attacker-controlled input and evaluating it. The result is remote code execution as the puppet service user on the central server.

The researchers found the bugs while preparing for a red team engagement, targeting a current Puppet Enterprise 2025.11.2 primary server. They also confirmed the exploit works against open-source Puppet 6.24.0, which dates back to July 2021. The flaw is not new code. It has been sitting in the report path for years.

Strictly speaking, the vulnerability is rated as authenticated, because it needs a valid agent client certificate. That is where the rating undersells the problem.

Autosign turns "authenticated" into "anyone on the network"

Puppet's certificate authority can be configured to autosign certificate requests, which is how most large deployments enroll new hosts without a human approving each one. Provisioning tools like Satellite or Ansible rely on it. Perforce's own advisory states it plainly: where the CA autosigns requests without strong verification, an unauthenticated network attacker can obtain a certificate, and then use this flaw.

So the realistic attack chain is short. Request a certificate from the CA, get it autosigned, submit a crafted report, run code on the server. No stolen credential required. No phishing. Just a network path to port 8140 and an autosign policy that was set up years ago for convenience and never revisited.

The server is the worst box to lose

A Puppet server is not just another server. It holds the CA signing key, which means an attacker who gets code execution on it can mint trusted certificates for any host. It holds the catalogs for every managed node, and catalogs often carry more than package lists. In Neodyme's engagement, one host's catalog contained a configuration file with PostgreSQL credentials, admin API tokens, and logins. And on Puppet Enterprise, the PXP execution protocol can turn server access into root command execution on managed hosts. Neodyme demonstrated exactly that in their lab: exfiltrate the CA key, mint a server certificate, and push a task to an agent as root.

That is the shape of this bug. One compromised agent certificate becomes the keys to the fleet.

The same release fixes a second flaw, and open-source Puppet gets neither

The November 3 release also fixed CVE-2026-115732, scored 9.0, a certificate-name authorization bypass. A certificate whose name extends an approved hostname, for example evil.target.example.com against a rule written for target.example.com, could pass the authorization check and impersonate a managed machine. With another host's certificate, an attacker can pull its catalog, push fake facts, and spoof software versions in reports. It is not in the KEV catalog, but the same patch closes it.

The awkward part is who gets a patch at all. Perforce's advisory names Puppet Enterprise and Puppet Core only. Open-source Puppet has no patched release, and Vox Pupuli, which maintains the OpenVox fork, says the open-source builds will not receive security updates. OpenVox itself shipped fixes. If you are still on community Puppet, there is no version to upgrade to. That is a migration decision now, not a patching decision.

Product Fixed in
Puppet Enterprise 2023.8.13, 2025.12.1, 2026.0.1
Puppet Core 9.1.3, 8.22.2
OpenVox Server 9.2.0, 8.18.0
OpenVox Agent 9.3.0, 8.32.0

The fleet check

Work through this in order. The patch is step one, but the certificate review is the part people skip, and it is the part that tells you whether the patch is enough.

  1. Find every Puppet server. Scan for listeners on TCP 8140 and check your asset inventory. Count the primary servers, compilers, and any OpenVox servers. If you find a server you forgot about, that one is the most likely to be unpatched.
  2. Check the version on each one. Run puppetserver --version on the server and compare it against the table above. Anything below the fixed build is vulnerable, and the public proof of concept means exploitation is not theoretical.
  3. Patch the server first, then the agents. Puppet Enterprise 2023.8.13, 2025.12.1, or 2026.0.1 depending on your line. OpenVox users take server 9.2.0 or 8.18.0 with agent 9.3.0 or 8.32.0. The same upgrade closes CVE-2026-115732 as well.
  4. Audit autosigning before you call it done. Run puppet config print autosign and read autosign.conf. If autosign accepts a broad pattern like *.example.com with no further check, tighten it or switch it off until the patch is in. Policy-based autosigning with a shared secret or CSR attributes is the boring, correct replacement.
  5. Review every certificate the CA has issued. Run puppetserver ca list --all and look for names you do not recognize, especially anything issued recently. Revoke anything suspicious with puppetserver ca clean --certname <name>.
  6. If you find a certificate you cannot explain, treat the CA as compromised. Regenerate the CA and reissue certificates. That is a painful afternoon, but it is cheaper than wondering whether someone still holds your signing key.
  7. If you run community open-source Puppet, plan the move now. Migrate to OpenVox or Puppet Enterprise. Until then, restrict port 8140 to known agent networks, turn autosign off, and approve certificate requests by hand.

CISA's due date for federal agencies is December 1. That date binds federal networks, but the exploitation evidence behind it does not care what kind of network you run. The fix has been out for two weeks, the proof of concept is public, and the KEV listing says someone is already using it. Patch the server, check the certificates, and fix the autosign policy that made a low-privilege bug into an unauthenticated one.

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